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Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, 
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty 
Summary 
The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of 
any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and 
complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some 
dimensions of the bargaining process – asymmetries and uncertainties in particular – by 
using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model 
which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain 
over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple 
issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of 
players’ optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, 
uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we 
introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on 
players’ strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects 
players’ behaviour and modifies the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. 
The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of 
natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite 
size are increasing. 
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Introduction  
The study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions 
and complex issues. Crucial questions to be addressed are, for example: What factors determine the 
outcome of negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties 
involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The research 
literature in this field has not yet succeeded in developing a comprehensive framework for analysis, 
and a number of theories have been proposed instead, each focusing on single aspects of the problem. 
As a consequence, theoretical results are not always supported by empirical evidence.  
The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining 
process – asymmetries and uncertainties in particular – by using a non-cooperative game theory 
approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more 
than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. We then explore the effects that 
uncertainty over the size of the pies has on players’ strategies and equilibrium agreements. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the 
related literature, describing the main progresses and the research gaps that still need further efforts. 
Section 3 introduces the underlying bargaining framework, while the results of numerically solving 
our dynamic bargaining model are summarised in Section 4. Sensitivity analysis is carried out in 
Section 5 whereas, in Section 6, we introduce uncertainty over the negotiated variables, and explore 
the implications for players’ strategic behaviour and equilibrium agreements. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
Brief survey of the literature 
The basic bargaining model introduced by Rubinstein (1982) describes the process through 
which negotiating agents try to reach an agreement as a situation in which players make offers and 
counter-offers over the terms of the agreement. Rubinstein’s model is an infinite horizon model of 
perfect information, which extends the work of Ståhl (1972) – a finite horizon alternating offers model 
– and takes explicitly into account players’ strategic incentives to cooperate. In the game, two players 
take turn in making a proposal over the sharing of a resource of known size: if players reach an 
agreement over the allocation, the game ends; if not, the game moves on to the next stage, when it is 
the other player’s turn to make a proposal. The model captures an intuitive process of bargaining and, 
although extremely simplified, provides the formal basis for many important results. In particular, it 
clarifies how different individuals’ characteristics affect the bargaining outcome.   3  
Rubinstein proves that every bargaining game of alternating offers that satisfies the 
assumptions of his model has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE)
1, which is reached 
immediately. From an economic point of view, the fact that negotiation ends in the first period implies 
that the equilibrium is efficient because no resources are lost in delay. Furthermore, the model predicts 
that when a player becomes more patient (that is, when he values the future more) relative to the 
opponent, his bargaining power increases, and so does his share of the cake
2. Thus, in this basic 
formulation, the bargaining power depends on players’ relative cost of waiting
3. 
In many real life situations, however, negotiations involve more than two players, and may 
involve more than one issue. Therefore, in recent years, several extensions of the standard 
Rubinstein’s model have been proposed in the attempt to deal with more complex bargaining 
situations and to find theoretical explanations for the observed empirical regularities. 
 
2.1 Multiple players 
When there are more than two players at the negotiation table, the characteristics and 
equilibrium solutions predicted by the basic Rubinstein model do not hold anymore. Even in the case 
of three players, the most natural extension of the Rubinstein bargaining structure leads to 
indeterminate results. The indeterminacy of the  3 ≥ n  player game has aroused much interest among 
researchers and various solutions have been proposed to arrive at a unique equilibrium outcome – 
either by adopting different (more refined) equilibrium concepts, or by modifying the structure of the 
game. 
For instance, by limiting the strategies available to players to stationary strategies (Shaked, 
1986), it is possible to obtain an equilibrium similar to the unique SPE of the two-player game.
4 The 
notion of stationary SPE may therefore be used to restore the uniqueness of the equilibrium in 
multilateral bargaining situations, but the restriction on the strategy space is rather strong. A more 
appealing way to address the problem of indeterminate result with  3 ≥ n  is to modify the structure of 
the game. For example, Jun (1987) and Chae and Yang (1988, 1994) propose a process where players 
are engaged in a series of bilateral negotiations, and any player that reaches a satisfactory agreement 
                                                           
1 A strategy profile is a Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium of a game if it is a Nash equilibrium of every 
sub-game of the game. More formally, for any history of the game G, h
k, a strategy s is sub-game 
perfect if, for any restriction s|h
k, it is an equilibrium of the game G(h
k).  
2 It is important to note that, when players do not discount payoffs, then any partition of the cake can 
be agreed upon at time 0, and can be supported in an SPE. In this case, neither players care about the 
time at which the agreement is struck – that is, negotiation is frictionless.  
3 As we shall see later on, players’ bargaining power may be influenced by many other factors, 
including the utility they derive from not reaching an agreement. 
4 Stationary strategies prescribe actions in every period that do not depend on time, nor on events in 
previous periods – that is, strategies are history independent. Herrero (1985) shows that if players have 
time preferences with a common, constant, discount factor, there is a unique allocation of the pie 
among the three players, which tends to an equal split as players become more patient.  4  
may “exit” the game. In Krishna and Serrano (1996) players have the possibility to leave the 
negotiations with their share before all players reach an agreement, but all offers are made to all 
players simultaneously – that is, bargaining is multilateral. With the introduction of such rules, the 
authors are able to identify a unique perfect equilibrium for any number of players.
5  
More recently, Manzini and Mariotti (2005) examine a different set of bargaining rules. Their 
model is designed as a two-stage game: the “outer” stage is the standard Rubinstein model, while in 
the “inner stage” members of a coalition have to agree among themselves over the choice of proposal 
to offer to the other party. The main result of their work is that unanimity in the inner stage seems to 
lead coalitions to adopt a less flexible stand over their opponent than majority rule. In another work 
(Manzini and Mariotti, 2003), the authors find that, when unanimity is required, the outcome of the 
negotiation is entirely determined by the toughest negotiator.  
 
2.2 Multiple issues 
Many real-life negotiations do involve a set of different issues, but most of the existing 
literature on non-cooperative games focuses on single issue negotiations. When all issues are bundled 
together in a negotiation package (complete package approach), standard theory still applies. 
Alternatively, multiple issues can be negotiated one by one (sequential approach). In such a case, the 
order in which problems are discussed may assume a strategic role and affect the final outcome of the 
negotiation. In the last decades, the study of the role of negotiation agenda has obtained increasing 
attention among researchers and various interesting contributions have been proposed in the literature. 
Fershtman (1990) for example, considers a situation in which two players with time preferences and 
additively separable utility functions negotiate, according to an alternating offer procedure, over two 
linear issues. The author shows that a player prefers to bargain first over the least important project to 
him, if it is the most important for his opponent. Furthermore, as players become more patient (and the 
cost of bargaining decreases) the impact of the agenda vanishes.  
The agenda is partially endogenised in Busch and Horstmann (1997), where the bargaining 
game is preceded by a separate bargaining round over the order of projects’ negotiation. In the work 
by Inderst (2000), the agenda of accepted projects becomes truly endogenous: players are allowed to 
freely choose the subset of projects for which they want to make an offer. The analysis reveals that the 
agenda can have a significant impact on payoffs and this impact does not seem to vanish as players 
become increasingly patient. It emerges that (i) bargaining simultaneously over a set of projects can 
improve efficiency by creating trading opportunities across issues; (ii) changing the agenda may have 
a distributive effect, and players may therefore prefer different agendas. Bac and Raff (1996) 
investigate how incomplete information about bargaining strength impacts the choice of the bargaining 
                                                           
5 The original model proposed by Krishna and Serrano (1996) has been extended to include the 
existence of interpersonal externalities by Kultti and Vartiainen (2004).  5  
procedure, where players’ bargaining strength is given by their time preferences, and players negotiate 
over more than one issue. The model involves two players negotiating à la Rubinstein over the 
division of two identical pies of size 1, and parties’ offers include the bargaining procedure (issue by 
issue vs. simultaneous), as well as an allocation. The model proposed has an asymmetric information 
structure, where one player is perfectly informed about the time preferences of both, whereas the other 
player is uncertain about the time preference of his opponent. With two possible realisations of the 
(uncertain) discount factor, the bargaining game has a sequential equilibrium with rationalising beliefs 
such that, while a weak player (high discount rate) prefers to negotiate simultaneously, a strong player 
(low discount rate) bargains sequentially to signal his bargaining strength.  
In a more recent work, In and Serrano (2003) develop a model to investigate the effects of 
agenda restrictions on the properties of the equilibrium outcome. What is found is that when the 
agenda is very restricted (such as, for example, when bargainers are forced to negotiate only one issue 
at a time, the one chosen by the proposer at each round), multiple equilibria and delays in agreement 
do usually arise. 
Lastly, Fatima et al. (2003) study the strategic behaviour of agents by using an agenda that is 
partly exogenous and partly endogenous, in an attempt to determine whether agents’ utilities can be 
improved by decomposing the set of issues into stages, allowing exogenous determination of issues for 
each stage, and endogenous, sequential negotiation of each stage. The analysis shows that the optimal 
number of decompositions for an agent depends on his negotiation parameters. In other words, there 
exist negotiation scenarios where the utility of both agents can be improved by negotiating in stages, 
compared to the utilities they get from single-stage negotiations. This result complements the 
explanations provided by previous works, namely that differing preferences over issues play an 
important role in determining negotiation agendas.  
 
2.3 Uncertainty 
Most of the traditional models of bargaining deal with issues known with certainty. In many 
real-life situations, however, the issues negotiated over may not be certain, but follow a stochastic 
process. Even though each player is perfectly informed about his opponent’s parameters, there is a 
source of uncertainty that can affect the negotiation outcome. In general, exogenous uncertainty may 
enter into a bargaining process in many different ways. For example, the size of the surplus over 
which players are negotiating may vary stochastically, as well as the disagreement point; the identity 
of the proposing player may also follow a random process; unexpected breakdowns or unexpected 
changes in bargaining positions may occur, and so on. Let us focus on the case in which uncertainty 
affects the size of the pie, as this is the case that will be analysed in the subsequent sections.   6  
Merlo and Wilson (1995)
6 propose an extension of the basic Rubinstein two-players 
alternating-offer game to a K -player bargaining model with complete information, where both the 
identity of the proposer and the size of the pie are stochastic, exogenously determined, and follow a 
general Markov process. Using the concept of stationary sub-game perfect (SSP) equilibria
7, the 
authors find that there exist a unique SSP equilibrium, which is efficient, even though it may involve 
(efficient) delays. This result does not exactly conform to what the standard literature predicts. In 
particular, according to the traditional models of bargaining, when an equilibrium exists, either it is 
efficient and such that agreement is reached immediately, or outcomes with delay may arise but 
efficiency is not guaranteed anymore. In this model, agreement may be delayed even in the unique 
SSP equilibrium, and the equilibrium is still efficient. The intuition for this result is that, when the 
future size of the cake is random, there can be potential benefits to waiting because the size of the cake 
may grow in the future. In other words, delay is caused by the expectation that the total bargaining 
value may rise in the future, and hence is efficient from the point of view of the negotiating parties. 
Eraslan and Merlo (2002) propose an extension of Merlo and Wilson (1995) to allow for 
general agreement rules, studying a multilateral stochastic bargaining game of complete information 
with  q-quota agreement. It has been shown that bargaining games with general q-quota agreement 
rule but fixed surplus (deterministic environment) usually admit a unique stationary sub-game perfect 
equilibrium which is efficient and involves no delays. This result, however, is not maintained in games 
with uncertainty over the size of the payoff. In particular, Eraslan and Merlo (2002) find that the 
uniqueness of the equilibrium is not guaranteed anymore and, even when the equilibrium is unique, for 
any agreement rule other than unanimity it need not be efficient. The kind of inefficiency that may 
emerge at the equilibrium is induced by the fact that agreement may be reached “too soon”. 
Intuitively, whenever an agreement entails less than unanimous approval, there exists a differential 
treatment between the players who are included in a proposal and the players who are excluded. In a 
stochastic environment there may be incentives for the players to delay agreement until a larger level 
of surplus is realised. This tension generates the possibility of inefficient agreements where players 
fail to realise all the gains from waiting, and may also generate multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs. 
Players who are offered a positive payoff in a state where the level of surplus is relatively small may 
be induced to accept it if they expect to be excluded from future agreements when the level of surplus 
is relatively large. 
 
                                                           
6 Various applications exist of this framework, which focus on the problem of government formation. 
Merlo (1997), for instance, investigates the process of government formation in post-war Italy, while 
Diermeier et al. (2004) explore the role of bicameralism in determining government durability. 
7 Recall that a strategy profile is sub-game perfect (SP) if, at every history, it is a best response to 
itself, and is stationary (SSP) if the actions prescribed at any history depend only on the current state 
and current offer.   7  
What are then the key issues that should be considered in designing a model to simulate 
negotiation processes among several players over several issues, and extending it to include 
uncertainty over the negotiated variables? 
First of all, when multiple players are involved in a non-cooperative negotiation process, the 
standard result of a unique equilibrium agreement do not hold any longer. To restore uniqueness, thus 
improving the usefulness of the models in exploring negotiation strategies and predicting possible 
outcomes, more stringent negotiation rules need to be applied, or, alternatively, one needs to impose 
refinements of the equilibrium outcomes. Secondly, when players bargain over more than one policy 
dimension, simultaneous bargaining is to be preferred: in line with the theory of issue linkage (see, for 
instance, Folmer et al., 1993; Cesar and De Zeeuw, 1996; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997; and, more 
recently, Alesina et al, 2001), simultaneous bargaining enlarges the zone of agreement, thus creating 
gains from trade and increasing the likelihood of an equilibrium to the negotiation process. Finally, 
when one considers the possibility of stochastic realisations of one or several of the negotiated 
variables, convergence of players’ strategies to a unique (efficient) equilibrium is more difficult: to 
improve chances of an agreement to emerge, therefore, more stringent decision rules can be imposed, 
such as unanimity.  
 
The negotiation framework 
The above three factors have been taken into account in developing a non-cooperative 
bargaining model that could usefully simulate the negotiation process and strategic interactions among 
several players negotiating simultaneously over several issues, when the size of the resource to be 
allocated may not be known with certainty. Players’ strategies will then depend on the expected 
realisation of future states of the world. If players fail to reach an agreement by an exogenously 
specified deadline, a disagreement policy is imposed. The disagreement policy is known to all players: 
it can either be an allocation that is enforced by managing authorities; it can be the loss of the 
possibility to enjoy even part of the negotiated variable; or it could be the continuation of the status 
quo, which is often characterised as inefficient and, thus, to be improved.  
The constitution of the game as a finite horizon negotiation is justifiable empirically – as 
consultations over which policies to implement cannot continue forever, but policy makers have the 
power (if not the interests) to override stakeholders’ positions and impose a policy, if negotiators fail 
to agree. This is also true in negotiation when an arbitrator is involved, who, with the agreement of all 
parties, has the power to take a final decision regarding the negotiated variables, should agents fail to 
reach an agreement. In finite horizon strategic negotiation models, it is unavoidable that “11
th hour” 
effects play an important role in determining the equilibrium solution. In fact, last minute agreements 
are often reported in negotiation settings – think, for instance, about labour agreements which tend to  8  
be reached just before the contract expires, or just before the set day for strikes. In some settings, the 
possible explanation of the “11th hour effect” appears straightforward. When the profit to be divided 
does not decrease over time, the outcome predicted by game theory is determined by the anticipated 
behaviour of players in the last period: the last proposer may hope to ripe (almost) all the benefits by 
making an ultimatum offer (Ma and Manove, 1993). Starting from the final round of the game and 
working back to the first period reveals that the subgame perfect equilibrium gives virtually all the pie 
to the last proposer. Under these conditions, the strategic behaviour of players may aim at creating the 
conditions for issuing an ultimatum. That is, as the deadline is approached, players may have to make 
larger concessions (Gneezy et al, 2003).  
Our model has as a starting point the negotiation framework proposed by Rausser and Simon 
(1992), but will include uncertainty in the negotiation space and explore how the strategies of players 
and the emerging equilibrium agreement vary with respect to the deterministic bargaining game. As 
the model has no closed form solution, we first validate the results of the Rausser and Simon model 
and its applications (Adams et al., 1996; Simon et al., 2003, 2006; Thoyer et al, 2001), and then 
explore numerically the impacts of uncertainty over the realisation of a negotiated variable on the 
equilibrium outcome of the game. 
 
3.1 The multilateral, multiple issues negotiation framework  
The constitutional features of our model are as follows: The set of players is I , with typical 
element i, and the set of feasible policy dimensions is  X , with typical element  X k ∈ . Players have 
well-specified utility functions, which compute players’ payoffs for each of the selected policy vectors 
X ∈ x . Crucially, players’ utilities will depend on a stochastic variable, k
~
. Let  ) (x i U  denote this 
utility functions, which satisfy four key assumptions: 
Assumption 1 (A1):  X  is a convex, compact subset on the K-dimensional Euclidean space, 
where K  denotes the number of issues to be negotiated simultaneously.  
Assumption 2 (A2): players’ utility functions are assumed continuous and strictly concave on 
X , and to satisfy the Von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. The assumption of strict concavity implies 
that players are risk averse – that is, players are reluctant to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff 
rather than another bargain with a more certain but possibly lower payoff.  
Assumption 3 (A3): players are assumed to have sufficiently different preferences, that is, for 
each player  j i ≠ , the maximisers of  ) (x i U  and  ) (x j U  are distinct. This assumption is invoked to 
avoid degenerate outcomes. Finally,  
Assumption 4 (A4): there exist a policy vector  X ∈ x  such that  0 ) ( ) ( U U U i i = > x x , 
where  X ∈ x  is the distinguished policy vector that is enforced on players, should they fail to reach an  9  
agreement by the exogenously specified terminal time T , and  0 U  is the utility of this disagreement 
policy. This assumption avoids degenerate case in which no agreement is preferred by all players to 
agreement.  
Players negotiate a complete package agreement, which will remain valid for g  periods of time 
– after which they may renegotiate the policy package agreed upon. In this framework, therefore, there 
is no learning, as uncertainty is not resolved in the course of the negotiation. 
Players are selected to submit an offer in an exogenously specified ordered, determined by a 
vector of access probabilities, ω. A player i, when submitting an offer, can only propose a policy 
package that belongs to the policy space  X , that is, he can only propose feasible policies.  
The only admissible coalition is the grand coalition, that is, unanimity is required to reach an 
agreement. As highlighted in Section 0, unanimity rules increase the chances of a self-enforcing 
agreement to emerge. Although this may seem excessively restrictive – in some cases, such as 
government formation, simple or qualified majority rules may be more realistic – unanimity is 
justifiable empirically when no cooperation is the status quo, when there is no possibility of binding 
agreements, or enforcement of an agreement is problematic – all cases in which the agreement must be 
self-enforcing and voluntary. Unanimity may also be appropriate when a compromise among different 
perspectives is sought. 
The game is played as follows. At each round  T t < , provided no agreement has yet been 
reached, the player specified by the sequence ω proposes a policy package  X ∈ x . In particular, we 
will assume that players, when selected to be proposers, maximise their utility by requesting for 
themselves a share  i k x , , and proposing to other players an allocation that is minimal with respect to 
their participation constraint. Next, all the remaining players respond to the offer in the order specified 
by ω. If all players accept the proposal, the game ends. If there is at least one player that rejects the 
offer, the next period of the game starts. In  1 + t , the next player in the sequence specified by ω 
proposes a policy package  X ∈ ' x ,  x x'≠ , which the remaining players can in turn either accept or 
reject. The game continues in this fashion until either all players agree to a proposed policy package, 
or the terminal time T  is reached, at which point the disagreement policy x  is implemented. 
The game is solved through a series of single-person optimisation problems, in which players 
attempt to maximise their gain from the final agreement over how to share the resources, subject to the 
total quantity of resources available, and to the agreement being accepted by the other players.  
The equilibrium concept for this game is sub-game perfection. As any policy which is weakly 
preferred by players to the disagreement outcome can be sustained as an outcome, an equilibrium 
refinement concept is invoked to restore uniqueness of the equilibrium solution. An equilibrium 
refinement provides a way of selecting one or a few equilibria from among many in a game. Each 
refinement attempts to define some equilibria as "more likely," "more rational" or "more robust" to  10  
deviations by players than others. For example, if one equilibrium results in all players earning more 
than another, it may be more likely that the players will coordinate or be naturally drawn to it. 
Following the original work by Rausser and Simon (1992), we apply the Sequential 
Elimination of Dominated Strategies (SEDS) (Myerson, 1978), which eliminates strategies that 
involve inadmissible (i.e., weakly dominated) play, starting from the final response round, and 
reaching the first round of negotiation. The outcome generated by such strategy profile is the 
equilibrium outcome for the game. 
 
3.2 Uncertain surplus 
Let us now introduce an element of uncertainty in the game, by assuming that one of the 
policy issues negotiated over varies stochastically, and its realisation is not known with certainty. 
As we are interested in allocation agreements which have a specified duration, the standard 
assumption in stochastic programming (with recurse) that uncertainty will be resolved in a second 
stage of the game cannot hold. In stochastic programming, players are assumed to take decisions 
accounting for uncertainty, that is, by assuming a probability distribution over possible realisations of 
different states of the world. Players are thus assumed to act in two stages, with some decisions being 
taken after uncertainty is resolved. In this specific case, actors must agree the rule for sharing a pie that 
will hold for one period (year), after which they may be able to renegotiate the agreement. Even 
though uncertainty over the resource to be shared in each period may decrease with time – perhaps 
because knowledge and ability to predict uncertain events increases – this will not affect the agreed 
sharing rule before the time at which agreement is to be reached. As a consequence, in as much as the 
uncertain policy issue is important in determining players’ utility, payoffs will vary stochastically with 
(unpredictable) changes in this issue. Because there is no way to know what state of the world will be 
realised before agreement is struck, we do not expect the inclusion of uncertainty in the model to cause 
efficient delays, as was the case in the model developed by Merlo and Wilson (1995). 
Assume that the realisation of at least one  K k∈  is not known with certainty, and denote the 
uncertain policy dimension by k
~
. Then let Φ  denote the set of possible states of the world (SoW), 
with typical element ϕ . The stochastic element k
~
 and its realisations Φ  are assumed to follow a 
specified probability distribution. Recall that, because of the constitutional features of our game, 
players are not able to update their beliefs about the distribution of k
~
. 
Refer to state  Φ ∈ ϕ  realised in period t as a state  ) , ( t ϕ . For any state, let  ) , ( t X ϕ  be the 
policy space over which players have to agree,  ) , ( t ϕ x  the agreed policy package, with 
) ,... ,..., ( ~ 1 K k x x x = x . 
In order to explore the impacts of uncertainty in one of the negotiated dimension on the 
bargaining strategies adopted by players, we will consider an additional constraint on players’  11  
strategies, namely that the utility they derive from any proposal is at least equal to the utility they 
derive from the minimum acceptable level of the negotiated variables. 
Let  ] [ min , , k i k i x =  be the minimum acceptable level of negotiated variable  k x  for player i. 




)] (min , , [ ,k i i i i U A s i x  





j i j i U A
1
) (x ω  is player 
i ’s acceptance set in the response round, and  ) (min ,k i i U  is the utility player i derives from the 
implementation of a policy package that is minimal with respect to his requirements.  
 
3.3 Players’ equilibrium strategies 
After inadmissible strategies are eliminated sequentially, players are left with a single person 
decision problem, and their equilibrium strategies can intuitively be characterised as in the original 
game by Rausser and Simon (1992): in response rounds, players will accept a proposed policy vector 
if and only if it yields them at least as much utility as their reservation utility for that round; in offer 
rounds, players will propose a vector that maximises their utility, subject to the utility of other players 
being at least as large as players’ reservation utilities.  
There is therefore a simple characterisation of the unique equilibrium strategies for a game 
with T  bargaining rounds: when called to value another player’s proposal, players only accept if the 
proposed policy package generates at least as much utility as their reservation utility in that bargaining 
round: when deciding whether or not to accept an offer, each player will compare the payoff he can 
get by accepting the offer with the expected payoff if he rejects it. Players’ expected utility from 
playing in a sub-game starting at  Δ + t  is the ω-weighted sum of the utilities he would obtain from 
all other parties’ proposals in that round, as every proposal that is part of the set of admissible 
solutions (after sequential elimination of weakly dominated strategies) is accepted (Simon et al, 2006). 
The reservation utility can thus be seen as the certainty equivalent of the lottery players would face if 
they were to reject the proposal. In the case of uncertain realisation of one of the negotiated issues, 
players’ reservation utility will also depend on their expectations about future states of the world. In 
offer rounds, on the other hand, players are faced with a two-part decision problem: they maximise 
their utility over the set of feasible policies that provide the other players at least as much utility as 
their reservation utility in the following bargaining round; and they select a policy among these 
maximisers. 
In the next section, the computational algorithm and the results of simulation exercises will be 
presented to illustrate the workings of the model, and assess its potential usefulness.  12  
Solving the model 
In order to explore multiple players, multiple issues negotiations within our framework, one 
need to specify the game in terms of players, negotiation variables, and players’ utility functions. In 
addition, the set of feasible variables (the constraints on the negotiated variables) must be well 
specified. In this section, we will present the computational algorithm used to solve the model 
numerically and the underlying parameters. Comparative statics exercises are then carried out in order 
to tease out the impacts of key parameters characterising players’ utility functions and, therefore, their 
strategies, on the equilibrium agreement.  
 
4.1 The computational algorithm 
As our negotiation game has a finite time horizon, it can be easily solved computationally. 
Formally, the game is solved by backward induction: first, one determines the optimal strategy of the 
player who makes the last move of the game. Then, the optimal action of the next-to-move player, 
taking the last player's action as given, is determined. This process continues until the first round of 
the game is reached, and all players’ actions have been determined. Sub-game perfect equilibria 
eliminate non credible threats.  
The computational algorithm developed to simulate the process of multilateral, multiple issues 
negotiations as described in the underlying bargaining framework is as follows: in the last period of 
the bargaining game – the first period of the computable model – the proponent selects a set of policy 
X ∈ x which maximises his utility. The other players will have to accept this proposal, because it is 
better for them than the disagreement policy by assumption. At round  1 − T  (round 2 of the 
computable model), player  j  will make an offer with probability  j ω , and it will be such that his 
utility is maximised, and the proposal yields to all other players a utility higher than their expected 
utility at round  2 − T  (reservation utility constraint) – which is the expected utility of moving to round 
1 + t  in the bargaining game. The proposal must also be consistent with the exogenous constraints on 
the negotiated variables. If the solution vector to player  j ’s constrained maximisation also satisfies 
his own expected utility from proceeding to the next bargaining round, player  j  will propose the 
vector. Otherwise, he will propose a solution vector that is rejected, and the game will pass to the next 
round. This procedure is repeated until the proposals made by all players converge to a limit point – 
the equilibrium solution. 
The computational model is solved recursively, by computing a series of single-person 
decision problems, until an acceptable degree of convergence is achieved. For the simulation, we use 
GAMS – General Algebraic Modelling System (McCarl, 2004)
 8.  
                                                           
8 In the GAMS code, a solution is found when  001 . 0 ≤ ε  – where ε  is the difference between two 
consecutive solutions.  13  
4.2 Players and utility functions 
We define our model in the class of spatial problems, where players’ utility is a declining 
function of the Euclidean distance between the agreed policy and players’ ideal points. We adopt this 
perspective for the main reason that this approach is less data intensive, and better suited to represent 
the utility functions of designated players who do not necessarily aim at profit maximisation. Adopting 
the more traditional approach of equating players’ preferences with their production or profit function 
may, in these cases, not be appropriate.  
We thus represent players’ preferences in the following way: the policy space  x ∪ X  consists 
of different locations, i.e. points in the k-dimension policy space. Each player has a most preferred 
location in X, called his ideal point, denoted by α = I i i ∈ ) (α . Player i’s utility is a declining function of 
the Euclidean distance between a policy vector x  and the ideal point. Let  ) , ( i α x d  denote the 
distance. In this approach, players are called idealistic or policy-seeking, and are assumed to support 
any policy, provided it is the best they can get. The approach often leads to compromises on all 
issues
9. 
For this first numerical example, let us assume that there are 5 players ( {} E D C B A i , , , , = ), 
indexed by i , who have to decide among them how to share two pies,  1 X  and  2 X . For the first 
exercise, we will assume that both  1 X  and  2 X  are of known size, whereas the second exercise will 
introduce a random element in the size of one of the pies,  2 X . Players’ utility function can be mapped 
as the Euclidean distance between the negotiated settlement and their most preferred location. As in 
the Rausser and Simon (1992) model, we will assume that the utility function of players takes the 
following form:  
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Where  i γ  is a positive constant, and  ) , ( i α x d  denotes the distance between player’s ideal 
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9 Alternatively, preferences could be modelled as fixed-sum game where parties are only interested in 
securing control over as much as possible of the available sum (money, power,…). These parties are 
said to be rent-seeking. Rusinowska et al. (submitted) include both rent-seeking and idealistic 
behaviour in one consistent model: players assign a degree of desirability and define the 
unacceptability set.  14  
where  n i, η  denotes the strength of player i’s preferences towards issue k ,  i ρ  is player i’s 
risk aversion coefficient – with  1 , 0 ∈ i ρ . Finally, ψ  is a positive constant to avoid indeterminacies of 
the square root; this constant is the same for all players, and has the only effect of scaling the utility 
function – thus the relative differences are not affected.  
In line with the description of the model, players will accept a proposal only if it yields them 
at least as much utility as their expected continuation payoff. For any proposal x, players’ 
participation constraint takes the following form:  
 
[4]  0 ) ( ) ( = ≥ x x i T i U U and 
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That is, the utility player i would derive from accepting the proposal by player  j  at time t 
( ) (
j
t i U x ) must be at least as large as player’s expected utility from rejecting the proposal and moving 
to time  1 + t . As stated in previous sections, player i ’s expected utility (or acceptance set) is equal to 
the sum of all the possible payoffs he could get in the next stage of the game, determined by the 
proposal of all the remaining players including himself, weighted by the proposer’s access probability, 
i ω , with ∑ =
i
i 1 ω . Table 1 reports the values that the utility parameters take for the numerical 
simulations.  
The allocation of the pie is constrained by the total quantity available to share, thus the sum of 
the quantities allocated to each player cannot exceed the total quantity available: 
 
[6] 
1 1 , X x
N
i ≤ ∑  and  2 2 , X x
N
i ≤ ∑  
Where  1 , i x  and  2 , i x  are the amount of  1 X  and  2 X allocated to player i respectively,  1 X  and 
2 X  are the respective sizes of the pies, determined exogenously.  
The vector of access probability – establishing the order in which players are called upon to 
make a proposal – is determined exogenously. As observed in the previous chapters, there are several 
ways in which the access probability of players can be determined. In our simulations, we will initially 
assign to players the same access probabilities.  
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Table 1: Parameters of the utility function in the baseline equilibrium 
Player (i ) 
i ω   ψ  
i γ   i n, α   i k, η   i ρ  
      
1 x k =   2 x k =   1 x k =   2 x k =    
A  0.2  100 100 18 24 0.3  0.7 0.5 
B  0.2  100 100 16 23 0.4  0.6 0.5 
C  0.2  100 100 24 24 0.6  0.4 0.5 
D  0.2  100 100 20 20 0.5  0.5 0.5 
E  0.2  100 100 20 20 0.5  0.5 0.5 
 
4.3 The baseline equilibrium 
Let us present the main outputs of our numerical solution of the bargaining model. Let us first 
focus on the baseline equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium computed using the parameters of Table 1. In 
the next section, we will perform a careful sensitivity analysis to identify the factors that most 
influence the equilibrium of the dynamic bargaining game. In our baseline, players’ proposals 
converge by the 7
th iteration, as shown in Figure 1. The rate of decline of the proposals is smaller for 
the last two players, who are also able to extract a higher surplus at the equilibrium.  
 


























































As predicted by the characterisation of players’ strategies, if the final round of the negotiation 
is reached (the first round of our computational model), each player, when selected to be the proposer, 
will propose an allocation such that his utility is maximised – that is, he will propose his ideal point. 
The respondents will have to accept it, as the proposal will yield them a strictly higher utility than the 
disagreement policy. This is shown in Table 2: when A is the proposer, the values of  1 x  and  2 x  
correspond to player A’s ideal point – and the same applies to all the other players. As a consequence,  16  
the utility derived by each player in the final round T , when they are selected to be the proposer, is at 
its highest. 
When responding to an offer, players will compare the utility they would attain by accepting 
the proposal with what they expect to get by rejecting it. This is the ω -weighted sum of the expected 
utility when each of the other player is a proposer, denoted by EU in Table 2. In round  1 − T , the 
proposer will maximise his utility, subject to the physical constraints on the cake being satisfied, but 
with an additional constraint – that the proposal yields his opponent a utility at least equal to their 
expected continuation payoffs. As shown in Table 2, therefore, when asked to be proposers in the 
second to last round of the game (the second round of our computational model), respondents will ask 
for a lower allocation of the cake, compatible with the participation constraint of others. The game 
continues in this fashion until a satisfactory degree of convergence is ensured. 
 
Table 2: Baseline equilibrium 
Simulation round  
(negotiation round) 












A 9.486833 9.331099 9.437363 9.406866 9.406866
B  9.370103 9.486833 9.43356 9.397909 9.397909
C  9.391632 9.359616 9.486833 9.432477 9.432477
D  9.393666 9.349774 9.4517 9.486833  9.417047
  
  
Round 1 (T) 
  
   E  9.393666 9.349774 9.4517 9.417047  9.486833
EU     9.40718 9.375419 9.452231 9.428226  9.428226
A  9.426226 9.375419 9.460392 9.442688 9.442688
B  9.40718 9.410532 9.46129 9.429141 9.429141
C  9.40718 9.375419 9.472804 9.441784 9.441784
D  9.413648 9.375419 9.465461 9.453845 9.436373
Round 2 (T-1) 
  
 
   E  9.413648 9.375419 9.465461 9.436373 9.453845
EU     9.413576 9.382442 9.465082 9.440766  9.440766
A  9.401423 9.382442 9.465082 9.44573 9.44573
B  9.413576 9.373819 9.465277 9.440766 9.440766
C  9.413576 9.382442 9.457437 9.445996 9.445996
D  9.418995 9.382442 9.468582 9.432993 9.441387
 
Round 3 (T-2) 
 
 
  E  9.418995 9.382442 9.468582 9.441387 9.432993
EU     9.413313 9.380717 9.464992 9.441375  9.441375
A  9.4044 9.380717 9.464992 9.443828 9.443828
B  9.413313 9.37314 9.465079 9.441375 9.441375
C  9.413313 9.380717 9.459902 9.44395 9.44395
D  9.416361 9.380717 9.466964 9.437712 9.441375
Round 4 (T-3) 
  
  
   E  9.416361 9.380717 9.466964 9.441375 9.437712
EU     9.41275 9.379202 9.46478 9.441648  9.441648
A  9.406893 9.379202 9.46478 9.44225 9.44225
B  9.412859 9.373683 9.46478 9.441648 9.441648
C  9.41275 9.379202 9.461691 9.442393 9.442393
D  9.413646 9.379202 9.465268 9.439272 9.441648
Round 5 (T-4) 
  
  
   E  9.413646 9.379202 9.465268 9.441648 9.439272
EU     9.411959 9.378098 9.464358 9.441442  9.441442 17  
A  9.410017 9.378131 9.464358 9.441442 9.441442
B  9.412158 9.376108 9.464358 9.441442 9.441442
C  9.411959 9.378409 9.463639 9.441979 9.441979
D  9.412158 9.378131 9.464358 9.440472 9.441442
 
 
Round 6 (T-5) 
  
   E  9.412158 9.378131 9.464358 9.441442 9.440472
EU    9.41169 9.377782 9.464214 9.441355  9.44135
A  9.410988 9.37792 9.464214 9.441355 9.441355
B  9.411919 9.376963 9.464214 9.441355 9.441355
C  9.41169 9.378152 9.46428 9.441853 9.441853
D  9.411919 9.37792 9.464214 9.440831 9.441355
Round 7 (T-6) 
  
   E  9.411919 9.37792 9.464214 9.441355 9.440831
 
 
It is interesting to note that players, when selected to be proposers, face different binding 
constraints. Consider, for instance, the case in which player C  is selected to be the proposer in round 
1 − T . Figure 2 depicts the situation that player C  is facing: his proposals to the other players are 
indicated by the 
C
T i x 1 , − ’s, whereas the solid lines denoted by  T i EU ,  are players’ participation 
constraints in that round – that is, combinations of  1 x  and  2 x  that yield to player i the same payoff as 
his expected payoff from the lottery in round T , generated by players’ proposals in the final round. In 
other words, it is the expected payoff to each player, should they reject the proposals in round  1 − T , 
and should the final round T  be reached.  
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When player C  is determining the proposals to make in the final round of the game, he will 
be faced with two binding constraints – namely, the expected utilities of players  A and B  – and the 
zone of agreement is represented by the shaded area. It is clear that the participation constraints of the 
remaining two players are slack – thus they benefit from a higher utility in round  1 − T  when C  is the 
proposer, thanks to the bargaining strength of players  A and B  which force player C  to make a 
proposal less favourable to himself.  18  
This can partly be explained by the fact that the ideal point influences players’ utilities: those 
players with lower ideal points will gain more than the others. The underlying reason is simple (see 
Simon et al, 2003): when players have very different preferences from the others, their participation 
constraints become binding on the other players.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Despite being simple, the above exercise illustrates how the deadline effect propagates 
through the model – that is, how changes in the last round of the bargaining game build up to magnify 
as we move backwards in the game. Let us now focus on other important features of the bargaining 
game and on their role in shaping the equilibrium outcome. First, let us analyse the role of players’ 
relative bargaining power. To analyse it, we perform a second round of simulations which are identical 
to the baseline case, with the exception of players’ bargaining power. In particular, we let us assume 
that bargaining power shifts from player  A to player B , keeping the power of other players constant, 
as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis – changing bargaining power 
Player (i) 
i ω  
  Initial location  Perturbed location 
A 0.2  0.1 
B 0.2  0.3 
C 0.2  0.2 
D 0.2  0.2 
E 0.2  0.2 
 
 
Intuitively, one would expect that, while the player with a higher access probability increases 
his equilibrium utility level, the other players experience a reduction in utility. The effect of increasing 
a player’s bargaining power is to tighten the constraint the other players face when proposing an 
allocation, as shown in Figure 3, where the participation constraint for player B  is higher in the case 
where bargaining power is shifted than in the baseline case. Similarly, the effects of increasing a 
players’ bargaining power is to relax the participation constraints of player  A in the penultimate 
round of negotiation, while leaving the other players’ participation constraints substantially 
unchanged. Thus, if the negotiations proceed to round  1 − T , player B  may be able to extract a larger 
surplus than in the baseline case. 
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Consider Figure 4. Each cluster of bars decomposes the change in players’ expected utilities, 
as access is shifted from player  A to player D – keeping other players’ bargaining power constant. In 
round  1 − T , the utility that player  A gains from his own proposal in the perturbed situation – 
compared to the baseline utility – is lower: this is because the participation constraint of player B  on 
player  A is binding in the penultimate round in the baseline case (see Table 2): increasing the 
bargaining power of player B  will necessarily lead to a tighter expected utility constraints, thus 
forcing player  A to make a proposal which is less favourable to himself than would otherwise be the 
case. At the same time, player B  gains substantially, independently of who is proposing in the 
penultimate round of the negotiation process. 
 




















At the equilibrium, the effects of shifting bargaining power from one player to another, 
keeping the other constant, may not be linear. The implication is that the ultimate effect of shifting 
bargaining power cannot be predicted, as this is not linearly related to the final outcome of the 
negotiation, but critically depends on other constitutional factors – such as decision rules, players’ 
preference parameters, the relative distance of their ideal points, so on and so forth. This is shown by  20  
the results of our simulation: the final impact depends on the bargaining design. Figure 5 shows the 
evolution of players’ participation constraints as we move backward in the game – that is, the 
difference between players’ expected utilities between the baseline case and the perturbed case.  




















It is clear that, through various interacting forces, the disadvantage of player  A decreases as 
we move along the game, while the advantage of player B  decreases. The cause of this effect is to be 
found in the preference structure and utilities of the players: the distance between player  A and player 
B ’s ideal points is relatively small, as compared to the other two players (see Table 4). Thus, in the 
longer run, player  A is able to benefit from the increased bargaining power of player B . 
 
Table 4: Distance between players’ ideal point 
  A B C D E 
A  0 2.24 6.00 4.47 4.47 
B  2.24 0 8.06 5.00 5.00 
C  6.00 8.06 0 5.66 5.66 
D  4.47 5.00 5.66 0 0 
E  4.47 5.00 5.66 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Let us now look at the impact of restricting the values that the negotiated variables can take. If 
the predictions of theoretical models are correct, we would expect to see that players have a lower 
utility from the negotiations, as the bargaining space – and as a consequence the gains from trade – is 
restricted. The new upper bounds for the negotiated variables are presented in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Perturbed constraints on the negotiated variables 
   1 = n   2 = n  
Baseline 130  100 
n X  
Perturbed 130  80 
  21  
Figure 6 shows the changes in utility level for each player when they are selected to be the 
proposers in the respective negotiation rounds – that is, it is the difference in utilities they enjoy when 
proposing an agreement in the restricted and baseline cases. It is clear that all players experience a 
decrease in utility as compared to the baseline case. The decrease is however not uniformly affecting 
all players: those who have stronger preferences for the restricted policy issue (that is, those with a 
higher ideal point for  2 X , players  A,  B , and C ) suffer more from this restriction than the other 
players. The decline in utility is mitigated by the different weights that individual players assign to 
2 X  relative to  1 X , as indicated by the different values of  k i, η  in Table 1: thus, players  A and B , 
who have a stronger preference towards  2 X  as compared to  1 X , suffer a loss higher than player C , 
who has a higher preferred point for  2 X , but assigns a low weights to this variable relative to the 
previous two players. This result of the simulation exercise is in line with both the theoretical findings 
of non-cooperative bargaining theory and the applications of non-cooperative bargaining models to 
water negotiations (see Carraro et al., 2005, and Carraro et al., 2007). Furthermore, more iterations are 
needed before a limit point equilibrium solution is found, indicating the increased difficulties in 
finding a compromise allocation. 
 

















Interestingly, the players with a higher ideal point for the restricted issue will “bargain harder” 
in the last rounds of the negotiation game, and require a higher share of the total resource available for 
themselves. This effect is shown in Figure 7: should the final round of the negotiation game be 
reached, the first three players, when selected to be proposers, will ask for themselves a higher share 
of  2 X . The effect decreases for player C as the game proceeds backward, because of the larger 
opportunity that this player has to compensate for losses in  2 X  with higher  1 X . These results are 
robust to further restriction in the issue space.  
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Consider now the case in which one of the player’s preferences towards the two negotiated 
variables changes in such a way that he now strongly prefers satisfying his ideal quantity of one 
negotiated variable relative to the other. Intuitively, one would expect the equilibrium shares of this 
player to change so that his equilibrium quantity of the strongly preferred variable is higher than in the 
baseline simulation exercise.  
In the simulation exercise, we change the relative weights that player D assigns to  2 X  
relative to  1 X , as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Changing the relative importance of the negotiated variables. 
 
Player D  1 , D η   2 , D η  
    
Initial 0.5  0.5 
Perturbed   0.2  0.8 
 
As expected, player D will require a higher share of  2 X  relative to the baseline case (see 
Figure 8).  
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What is of interest is that his stronger position affords player D a stronger bargaining 
position, and his participation constraints in round  1 − T  tightens, while the participation constraints 
of the remaining players are substantially unchanged (Figure 9,  1 − T ). This effect is preserved 
through the backward induction process, and in equilibrium player D will enjoy a higher utility level 
(Figure 9, Equilibrium). In this model, there seem to be two sources of bargaining power: first of all, 
players’ access – which, however, is neither linearly nor monotonically related to players’ equilibrium 
payoffs – and players ideal points – both in terms of their magnitude and relative importance.  
 


















































T-1 Equilibrium  
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that, in the long run, a relatively large change in players’ 
weighting of the negotiated variables leads to utility levels that are significantly higher for that player, 
but leave the expected utilities of other players substantially unchanged.  
 
The role of uncertainty 
 
One of the key aspects of negotiation processes is uncertainty over the size of the negotiated 
variables (the size of the pie). Let us analyse how this type of uncertainty affects the agreement and 
players’ utilities. In the numerical analysis, we look at the impact of introducing a random component 







i ≤ ∑   24  
where  2
~
X  is an uncertain component of the size of the pie to be divided. In the case of 
negotiations on water availability, for instance, the total quantity available depends in part on 
precipitation levels, which, however, cannot be predicted with certainty.  
To demonstrate the relationship between the introduction of uncertainty in the realisation of 
one of the negotiated variables and the frequency of different solution, we report the results of a Monte 
Carlo experiment, in which we solve the model for 100 randomly drawn values of  2
~
X , assuming an 
exogenously specified underlying probability distribution for the unknown term. Using random inputs, 
the deterministic model is essentially turned into a random model. 
The choice of the underlying distribution to simulate random sampling may impact the results 
of the simulations. For the numerical example, we will assume that the random component of  2 X , 
2
~
X , is drawn from a gamma probability distribution
10, with shape parameter 13 and scale parameter 
8.5. The corresponding mean and standard deviations are, respectively, 104.4 and 29.3. Figure 10 
shows the frequency distribution of the realised values of  2
~
X , together with some basics statistics.  
 





































For each of the 100 sampled bargaining problems, we examine the emerging strategies of 
players, as well as the equilibrium solutions and utilities, for 100 bargaining rounds.  
                                                           
10 There are various types of probability distribution one could use: the normal distribution is 
applicable to variables whose values are determined by an infinite number of independent random 
events; very rare events are best represented using the Poisson distribution. The normal distribution is 
symmetrical around the mean and, in general, it is used when (i) there is a strong tendency for the 
variable to take a central value; (ii) positive and negative deviations from the central value are equally 
likely; and (iii) the frequency of deviations falls off rapidly as the deviations become larger. The 
gamma distribution is, on the other hand, widely used in engineering to model continuous variables 
that are always positive and have a skewed distribution.  25  
From the results, it would appear that it takes longer to find an agreement when uncertainty 
over the resource is included. Moreover, in 14% of the cases, a feasible agreement cannot be achieved 
– that is, the equilibrium offers of players are not compatible with the resource constraint.  
The first 5 histograms of Figure 11 show the frequency distribution of players’ utilities when 
the size of negotiated variable is uncertain – so, for instance, player D and F  experience more 
frequently low utility levels when all the players entertain the possibility of variations in the size of 
one pie. The variability of players’ equilibrium utilities differs among the players, while for all of them 
the equilibrium (limit) utility is lower in the stochastic case than in the deterministic case, as shown by 
the lower right quadrant of Figure 11. 
 




































































































































Of course, the deterministic case assumes a known realisation of the pie. But what happens to 
players’ utilities if this belief is mistaken? Would they be better off by considering this possibility in 
their bargaining strategy? 
In order to assess the ex post efficiency of the different negotiation frameworks, let us 
compare the utilities that player would derive, in equilibrium, from the negotiated agreement under the 
deterministic and stochastic case. Table 7 below reports the equilibrium shares agreed upon in the 
deterministic and stochastic models.  
  26  
Table 7: Equilibrium shares 
X1  A B C D E 
Deterministic  0.2002 0.2002 0.2013 0.2002 0.2002 
Random  0.2026 0.1986 0.2027 0.2018 0.2018 
X 2        
Deterministic  0.2004 0.2001 0.2014 0.1985 0.1985 
Random  0.1997 0.1997 0.2015 0.1997 0.1997 
 
As shown in the first left hand side quadrant of Figure 12, players do, in general, better in the 
deterministic type of model as compared to the stochastic type. However, as the resource available 
begins to shrink, players’ utility increases, in general, when they take into account the uncertainty 
surrounding the realisation of the surplus. The explanation is intuitive: as players begin to account for 
uncertainty in their strategy, they will try to negotiate harder, expecting a higher share of the surplus, 
in order to increase their chance of coming closer to their ideal
11. 
 




































































                                                           
11 Note that, because of the construction of our preference function, an excess allocation of water is a 
punishment for players. This may not be realistic in some circumstances, as discussed more in details 
in the concluding section.  27  
Conclusions 
The model proposed in this paper attempts to simulate the process of negotiation among 
multiple players, who have to decide on how to share a surplus of fixed size. In this context, 
negotiation rules are simulated through an offer and counteroffer procedure. Players have payoff 
functions that depend on the share of the surplus that they can secure for themselves – with different 
negotiated variables having different importance for each player, thus generating space for tradeoffs 
among them. Furthermore, players have varying access probabilities, which signal the relative strength 
at the bargaining table and thus influence the equilibrium agreement.  
Through a series of simulations in which five players negotiate over the respective shares of 
two cakes, we have examined the emerging equilibrium agreements and their characteristics. What can 
be inferred about these problems by applying numerical simulation?  
First of all, the results conform to expectations when there is no uncertainty over the 
negotiated variables. As in the Rausser-Simon model and its applications, increasing the access 
probability of a player will yield outcomes that are more favourable for the “more powerful” player, 
but also to players with similar preferred positions. Convergence of the solution is attained in few 
iterations of the model – which can in part address some of the critiques moved to backward induction, 
as there is scepticism of long and involved inductive chains.  
This result does no longer hold when we restrict significantly the range of admissible values 
for the negotiated variables. In fact, restricting the size that the negotiated variables can take reduces 
the opportunities for trade, yielding potentially lower utilities to all players. In some cases, excessively 
reducing the boundaries of the negotiated variable may shrink the bargaining space so much that no 
zone of agreement remains. Should this result emerge when exploring a real problem using this 
framework, it would be advisable to attempt changing the decision rule – from unanimity to qualified 
majority, for instance. 
Importantly, the effect of bargaining power on the equilibrium agreement is non linear, but 
rather evolve in complex way through the process of backward induction. The effect of shifting access 
depends crucially on other constitutional factors with which it interacts – such as decision rules, 
players’ preference parameters, the relative distance of their ideal points, so on and so forth. Thus, 
there are synergies among players or issues that affect the ultimate impact of bargaining, contrary to 
the assumption of the standard Nash games. 
Finally, uncertainty over one of the negotiated variables crucially affects the equilibrium 
outcome and the players’ strategies. Our main results are: 
(i)  when uncertainty is introduced, the negotiation takes, on average, longer (14 
rounds as opposed to 7 rounds in the deterministic case);  28  
(ii)  in some cases, players’ strategies do not even converge to a feasible solution – that 
is, players’ offers crystallise on values that are not compatible with the resource 
constraint for neither variables;  
(iii)  explicitly accounting for uncertainty in the realisation of the surplus leads, under 
some circumstances, players to bargain harder: ex post, they are better off only 
when the realisation of the surplus is low, as compared to the deterministic case. 
 
These results are in line with intuition and with previous results of similar models: they 
therefore lend support to the hypothesis that non-cooperative bargaining is a useful framework for 
exploring negotiation processes and players’ strategic behaviour. Applying non-cooperative 
bargaining theory can provide some useful insights, based on formal models, as to which factors 
influence to a significant extent players’ strategies and, as a consequence, the resulting equilibrium 
agreement policy. 
The value added of exploring management problems within a non-cooperative bargaining 
framework lies in the ability of the approach to help finding politically and socially acceptable 
compromise. The proposed model can find several applications, in particular, in the field of natural 
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